Semirara is described by the National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms (Nasecore) as the source of roughly 97 percent of Philippine domestic coal production, and coal remains a major fuel for the power sector. A resource of that scale should be awarded through transparent rules, clear obligations, and competition for the best public benefit.
The debate around Semirara should not turn into a personality contest or a private quarrel among bidders. The DOE’s process gives the government a chance to ask the right question: who can deliver the strongest, most enforceable deal for the state and for electricity consumers?
Bidding is how government discovers value
Competitive bidding works because it forces interested parties to put numbers, commitments, and guarantees on the table.
The Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) public-private partnership is the easiest recent example. The government awarded the project after SMC-SAP & Company consortium offered the highest revenue share: 82.16 percent of future gross revenues, excluding passenger service charges.
The winning deal also included a P30-billion upfront payment and a fixed P2-billion annual payment, with the Department of Finance estimating around P900 billion in government revenues over the concession period.
That outcome came from a bidding framework that made bidders compete for the government’s advantage. The public got a better fiscal offer, the airport got a modernization path, and the state kept a strong claim on future value.
The same principle should apply to Semirara.
Semirara needs a deal that serves consumers
Nasecore’s Oct. 19 statement — penned by the group’s head, longtime consumer advocate Pete Ilagan — gives DOE more reason to insist on discipline in the auction.
The consumer group cited Consunji-controlled Semirara Mining and Power Corp.’s (SMPC) own disclosures showing lower capital spending, lower coal production, workforce reductions, operational disruptions, and an asset dispute involving mining equipment. It said SMPC cut its 2026 capital expenditure budget to P1.9 billion from P5.9 billion in 2025, and reduced coal-business capex to P800 million from P4.8 billion. It also cited a 55-percent year-on-year drop in second-quarter 2026 coal production, from 5.6 million metric tons to 2.5 million metric tons.
Those figures belong inside the bidding conversation. They show why DOE needs a process that rewards concrete future performance. A bidder should win because it offers measurable benefits: production commitments, investment commitments, domestic supply commitments, mine rehabilitation obligations, equipment continuity, consumer protection, and a better economic return to government.
The rules should do the heavy lifting
A well-designed bid process protects the public from vague promises.
The DOE can require bidders to state how much they will invest, how much coal they will produce, how much will support domestic power needs, how they will prevent supply interruptions, and how they will handle mine assets when the contract changes hands. It can require guarantees, penalties, and reporting obligations.
This is where bidding becomes more than procurement. It becomes policy.
Semirara is tied to power prices. When local coal supply tightens, generators may rely more heavily on imported coal. Imported coal exposes consumers to global fuel-price swings. Nasecore’s warning is that weaker domestic output can be felt through generation charges and wholesale electricity prices.
The DOE bidding process can turn that warning into enforceable safeguards.
Experience still has to compete
Incumbency can be useful. A long-time operator knows the mine, the workforce, the logistics, and the regulatory terrain.
But experience still has to be tested against current commitments. If the Consunji group wants another term, it should compete under the same transparent standards as everyone else. It should show what it will deliver next, how much it will invest, what it will guarantee, and how consumers will benefit.
That is fair to the incumbent. It is fair to other bidders. It is fair to the government. Most of all, it is fair to electricity users who ultimately pay for fuel decisions through monthly bills.
The NAIA case showed the value of letting bidders sharpen their offers in public-interest terms. The winning bidder had to offer the best deal under the rules. That model should guide the Semirara auction.
Consumers need a better bargain
The Semirara contract should produce more than continuity. It should produce a better bargain.
A better bargain means stable domestic coal production. It means stronger government revenue. It means clear investment obligations. It means worker and community transition plans. It means no stranded mine because of unresolved equipment disputes. It means power consumers see real protection from supply shocks.
The DOE’s bidding rules and process are the tools for achieving that. The government should defend them, enforce them, and use them to extract the best possible terms.
The country has already seen how a competitive infrastructure bidding process can unlock a stronger deal for the state. Semirara deserves the same seriousness.
The coal comes from one island, but the consequences reach every Filipino’s electricity bill.
Senior Reporter
